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NSA spying on Europe revelations – our experts react
Last week, new evidence came to light of the U.S National Security Agency’s widespread surveillance
of European populations and leaders, most prominently, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. We
asked our expert contributors for their reactions.
It is important to distinguish between the issues of governments spying on each other and
of the protection of EU citizens’ personal data – David Cadier -LSE Department of International
Relations and LSE IDEAS
In the long run we may look back on this as a seminal moment in transatlantic relations   - Chris
Brown - LSE Department of International Relations
The NSA leaks will put pro-American forces in Europe even more on the defensive - Matthew Hinds
-  LSE Department of International History
It is important to distinguish between the issues of governments spying on each other and of the
protection of EU citizens’ personal data
David Cadier - LSE Department of International Relations and LSE IDEAS
Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had been famously looking for Europe’s phone
number – it seems that the NSA has found it. The current row over US surveillance activities in
Europe has the potential to harm the transatlantic relationship, leading some analysts to compare
it the ‘Iraq Crisis’ of 2003. As then, European public opinions are mobilized and will have to be
counted with. A difference though is that, so far, European governments have not presented a
disunited front as they did in 2003. This is in spite of the fact that the leaked documents made the
distinction between Washington’s ‘second-party’ (e.g. UK) and ‘third-party’ (e.g. Germany or France) allies and
have a polarizing potential somehow reminiscent to that of Donald Rumsfeld’s (captious) opposition between ‘Old’
and ‘New’ Europe.
In Germany, protests and condemnations have been above all directed at the US and not at other European
states that have either, according to the allegations, played a role in the NSA program or are known to have their
own surveillance program. This focus on the US can also be explained by the symbolic weight of the story around
Chancellor Merkel’s mobile phone.
In contemplating the potential consequences of this scandal, it is important to distinguish between the issues of
governments spying on each other and of the protection of EU citizens’ personal data. While the spat around the
former can be expected to deflate relatively quickly (it should not in any case irremediably obstruct diplomatic
channels), the latter is cause of a more profound disagreement between the EU and the US that has been anterior
to – and which is likely to survive – the NSA scandal.
How might the negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) be affected by this
context? It is unlikely that the whole process will be derailed by the scandal: put simply, the geo-economic stakes
are too high. In fact, EU leaders meeting in Brussels have made clear that they have no intentions of cancelling
the talks. It might however indirectly affect the shape of the deal and potentially complicates its ratification. Berlin
has been recently reported to wish to include data safeguards in the negotiations, a move that is likely to be
resisted by the European Commission. On its part, the European Parliament (EP) adopted two weeks ago a
resolution calling for a suspension of the (separate) SWIFT agreement on the sharing of bank transfer data
between the EU and the US while its largest political grouping, the EPP, advocated in parallel the scrapping of the
data exchange agreement known as Safe Harbour. The EP is an actor to be watched in particular: its vetoing of
the initial SWIFT agreement back in early 2010 was its first fait d’armes in influencing EU external relations;
European Parliamentarian elections will be held next year; and if the TTIP is eventually concluded it will need to
be ratified by the EP.    
In the long run we may look back on this as a seminal moment in transatlantic relations  
Chris Brown – LSE Department of International Relations
More or less everything that could be said about the NSA’s spying on America’s allies has been
said, and more than once; we can be clear that (i) everyone does it, but that (ii) the NSA (and
Britain’s GCHQ) are better at it than anyone else, (iii) most governments are inwardly fairly
philosophical about such activities, but (iv) public opinion isn’t, so at least feigned outrage is
required. What else is there to say?  Perhaps this; for decades the ‘Five Eyes’ programme linking
the signals intelligence operations of US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand has been basic
to the ‘Special Relationship(s)’ that these members of the Anglosphere have with one another, and has been a
source of considerable annoyance to other ‘friendly’ countries, who feel the exclusivity of this partnership implies
that they (particularly the French and the Germans) can’t be trusted.
Now that the scale of the operations of the Five Eyes partners has been revealed to the world at large – it was
always known to other intelligence services – it may be more difficult to sustain. The Americans and the Germans
are already talking of a new intelligence-sharing relationship, and similar deals may have to be made much more
widely. The exclusivity of the Five Eyes partnership may have to end, and if it does the consequences will go
beyond the limited area of intelligence sharing.  Given the increasing inability of the UK’s armed forces to make a
serious contribution to allied operations, the relationship between GCHQ and the NSA is the last remaining feature
of US/UK relations that remains ‘special’. If that relationship goes it will signal a seismic change in British foreign
policy and even if the immediate effects are minimal, in the long run we may look back on this as a seminal
moment in transatlantic relations.
The NSA leaks will put pro-American forces in Europe even more on the defensive
Matthew Hinds – LSE Department of International History
Out of all of the influential sections of opinion in Europe, the one that will find the NSA revelations
the most distressing will no doubt be those politicians who identify themselves as pro-American.
Their politics are indelibly tied to their own core belief in fostering closer relations with the United
States, an objective made harder to justify to their domestic constituencies after the NSA debacle.
As such, in Germany, the actions of the US have taken on existential significance for the Merkel
government. After having publicly backed Washington over the Snowden episode last summer,
Merkel has now been placed in a most awkward diplomatic situation, with US surveillance bringing to mind – in a
German context -the machinations of the Stasi.
For someone like Merkel’s predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder, leader of the SDP (Social Democratic Party), such
revelations would have in some respects strengthened his political hand as it would have merely confirmed his
own suspicions of American hegemony. But for Merkel, the same Chancellor who has said more than once that
the US was a beacon of freedom while she lived under the tyranny of East German surveillance, these NSA leaks
will undoubtedly put her on the back-foot politically and force her to question the extent and nature of German-
American ties. With that being said, the wider security and economic relationship between the United States and
Europe is far too enmeshed for it to be significantly damaged from Washington’s spying. Indeed, from the
perspective of the intelligence community, the revelations hardly come as a surprise. It has emerged that the
intelligence services from many European countries, including Britain, Spain and Denmark have to some degree
colluded with their counterparts in Washington. Instead, the impact of the NSA leaks is likely to take a far more
insidious form. Namely, it will put pro-American forces in Europe even more on the defensive and contribute to the
transatlantic drift that has marked this century.
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